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Abstract
Electrical power grids are vulnerable to cascading failures that can lead to large
blackouts. Detection and prevention of cascading failures in power grids is impor-
tant. Currently, grid operators mainly monitor the state (loading level) of individual
components in power grids. The complex architecture of power grids, with many
interdependencies, makes it difficult to aggregate data provided by local compo-
nents in a timely manner and meaningful way: monitoring the resilience with re-
spect to cascading failures of an operational power grid is a challenge.
This paper addresses this challenge. The main ideas behind the paper are that
(i) a robustness metric based on both the topology and the operative state of the
power grid can be used to quantify power grid robustness and (ii) a new proposed
a distributed computation method with self-stabilizing properties can be used to
achieving near real-time monitoring of the robustness of the power grid. Our con-
tributions thus provide insight into the resilience with respect to cascading failures
of a dynamic operational power grid at runtime, in a scalable and robust way. Com-
putations are pushed into the network, making the results available at each node,
allowing automated distributed control mechanisms to be implemented on top.
1 Introduction
Power grids represent critical infrastructure: all kind of services (basic services, gov-
ernmental and private) depend on the continuous and reliable delivery of electricity.
Power grid outages have a large effect on society, both in terms of safety and in terms
of economic loss. The large-scale introduction of “renewable energy sources” and the
current (centralized) architecture of the power grid make it more likely that large power
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outages will become more common. Encouraged by government subsidies and a trend
to become more “green”, consumers are becoming producers of electricity by installing
solar panels and wind mills [26]. Part of this produced power will be used locally, but
excess power can be sold and fed back into the power grid. This in turn leads to grid
instability [40]: it is more difficult to predict, and hence balance, electricity production
when there is a large amount of small producers spread over a large geographical re-
gion, instead of a couple of large producers. The current power grid architecture does
not support the introduction of renewables at this scale [1].
The current organization of the power grid thus makes larger grid failures more likely
to occur: initial local disruptions can spread to the rest of a power grid evolving into a
system-wide outage. In a power grid, an initial failure can, for example, be caused by an
external event such as a storm, and spreads to the rest of the network in different ways
including due to causes such as instability of voltage and frequency, hidden failures of
protection systems, software or operator errors, and line overloads. For example, in
the case of cascades due to line overloads, an overloaded line is "tripped” by a circuit
breaker. At this point electricity can no longer flow through the line, and the power
contained in the line flows to other lines. This might lead to overloading (part of) these
lines causing them to be tripped as well. As this process repeats over and over again,
more lines are shut down, leading to a cascading failure of the power grid [12, 33].
Cascading effect due to line overloads, and preventing such cascading failures form
the main focus of this paper.
In order to detect (and ultimately prevent) cascading failures it is necessary to monitor
(and alter) the current state (power load distribution) of the power grid. The emerging
Smart Grid provides exactly this: a power grid with a communication overlay that con-
nects sensors and effectors. In effect, a Smart Grid is a large-scale distributed system
that enables the monitoring of line loads and that enables changing the state of the net-
work by tripping and untripping lines. In the remainder of the paper a Smart Grid is
assumed.
Given this context of the Smart Grid, this paper addresses two main research ques-
tions: What should be monitored?, i.e., is there a metric that can be used for cascading
failure prediction? How to monitor?, i.e., how should aggregation be performed and
which temporal resolution is required for the monitoring. In addition, it should be pos-
sible to extend the proposed (passive) monitoring scheme to an (active) scheme that
automatically alters the state of the grid in order to prevent cascading failures.
The main contribution of the paper is a new distributed monitoring approach that can
be used to monitor the robustness of the power grid with respect to cascading failures.
The monitoring approach is based on the distributed computation of the robustness
metric we introduced in [23, 24]. Our contributions in this paper include the extension
of a distributed gossiping algorithm [9] with self-stabilization mechanisms to account
for network dynamics. The resulting framework allows distributed aggregates to be
computed fast and reliable, which forms the core of the proposed monitoring approach.
Our main results show that we are able to compute the complex robustness metric using
simple robust distributed primitives with results readily made available at each node in
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the network. This is an important property as the mechanisms presented in this pa-
per can be seen as a measurement framework to be used in real-time for the design of
distributed control mechanisms. Our approach scales very well with network size (log-
arithmic order) in terms of convergence time. The precision of the computations can
be fixed by changing the message sizes and is independent on the network parameters
(number of nodes, diameter, etc.).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the metric
used to assess the robustness of the power grid with respect to cascading failures. Sec-
tion 3 presents the distributed algorithm for the online computation of the robustness
metric. Section 4 discusses the simulation results that show the applicability the pro-
posed approach. Section 5 presents the current state of the art in power grid monitoring
and cascading failure detection. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Robustness Metric
Different topological metrics have been identified in literature that indicate the vulner-
ability of a power grid against cascading failures on the basis of which the most critical
nodes in a network are identified. Examples of such topological metrics are average
shortest path length, betweenness centrality [15] and the gap metric [13]. However,
next to a topological aspect, power grids also have a physical aspect. In particular, elec-
trical current in a power grid behaves according to Kirchoff’s laws [5]. A metric that
quantifies the robustness of an operational power grid with respect to cascading fail-
ures should take both these aspects into account. Our robustness metric from [23, 24]
does exactly this, and it therefore forms the starting point for the distributed power grid
monitoring algorithm proposed in this paper. The robustness metric RCF (for Robust
against Cascading Failures) assess the robustness of a given power grid with respect to
cascading failures due to line overloads. The metric relies on two main concepts: elec-
trical nodal robustness and electrical node significance. Higher values of RCF indicate
a robuster, i.e., more able to resist cascading failures, power grid. The remainder of
this section provides a summary from our earlier work on robustness metrics, we refer
to [23, 24] for more details.
2.1 Electrical Nodal Robustness
The electrical nodal robustness quantifies the ability of a bus (i.e. a node in a graph
representation of a power grid) to resist the cascade of line overload failures by incor-
porating both flow dynamics and network topology. In order to calculate this value for
a node, three factors are of importance: (i) the homogeneity of the load distribution
on out-going branches (i.e. links in a graph representation of a power grid); (ii) the
loading level of the out-going links; and (iii) the out-degree of the node.
Entropy is used to capture the first and the last factors described above: the entropy of
a load distribution at a node increases as flows over lines are distributed more homoge-
3
neously and the node out-degree increases. The entropy of a given load distribution at
a node i is computed by Equation (1):
Hi =
d∑
j=1
pij log pij (1)
where d refers to the out-degree of the corresponding node, whereas pij corresponds
to normalized flow values on the out-going links lij , given as:
pij =
fij∑d
j=1 fij
(2)
where fij refers to the flow value in line lij . To model the effect of the loading level
of the power grid the tolerance parameter α is used (see [30]). The tolerance level of a
line lij , αij , is the ratio between the rated limit and the load of the corresponding line
lij .
Combining Equations (1) and (2) with the tolerance parameter α to capture the impact
of loading level on the robustness, the electrical nodal robustness of a node i (i.e. Rn,i),
which takes both the flow dynamics and topology effects on network robustness into
account, is then defined as:
Rn,i = −
d∑
j=1
αijpij log pij (3)
In Equation (3), the minus sign (-) is used to compensate the negative electrical nodal
robustness value that occurs due to taking the logarithm of normalized flow values.
2.2 Electrical Node Significance
Not all nodes in a power grid have the same influence on the occurrence of cascading
failures. Some nodes distribute a relatively large amount of the power in the network,
while other nodes only distribute a small amount of power. When a node (or line to a
node) that distributes a relatively large amount of power fails, the result is more likely
to lead to a cascading failure, ultimately resulting in a large grid blackout. In contrast,
if a node that only distributes a small amount of power fails, the resulting redistribution
of power can usually be accommodated by the other parts of the network. Thus, node
failures have a different impact on the context of cascading failure robustness and this
impact depends on the amount of power, distributed by the corresponding node. The
impact of a particular node is reflected by the electrical node significance δ, which is:
δi =
Pi∑N
j=1 Pj
, (4)
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where Pi stands for total power distributed by node i while, N refers to number of
nodes in the network. Electrical node significance is a centrality measure that can be
used to rank the relative importance (i.e., criticality) of nodes in a power grid in the
context of cascading failures. Failures of nodes with a higher δ will typically result in
larger cascading failures.
2.3 Network Robustness Metric
The network robustness metric RCF ([23, 24]) is obtained by combining the nodal
robustness and node significance:
RCF =
N∑
i=1
Rn,iδi. (5)
The above metric can be used as a robustness indicator for power grids. This is done as
follows: for a normally operating power grid the robustness metric is calculated, which
results in some value v. This value is used as a base case. During normal operation the
robustness metric value will change somewhat, because different nodes will demand
different electricity quantities over time, leading to different loading levels in the net-
work. However, a larger change in the robustness metric, a drop in particular, indicates
that a cascading failure becomes more likely and grid operators may need to take eva-
sive actions (e.g., adding reserve capacity to the grid or demand shifting of power).
Note that, in the general case, it is complicated to determine what good safety margins
are, or for which values of the robustness metric the exact tipping point is located (i.e.,
the point where a small failure will lead to a massive blackout). Ultimately this needs
to be determined by the grid operators. We have determined this point experimentally,
by simulation, for a specific power grid: the IEEE 118 Power system (see Section 4.4
). We refer to [25] which presents a more general and structured investigation of this
topic.
3 Decentralized Aggregation
The computation of the robustness metric introduced in the previous section in a cen-
tralized manner raises a number of challenges when applied to large areas (i.e., provinces
or even whole countries). Scalability, single-point-of-failure, real-time results dissemi-
nation, fault tolerance, maintenance of dedicated hardware are just a few examples that
hint towards a decentralized approach as a more convenient solution.
The described problem maps onto a geometric random graph (mesh network), where
the nodes can communicate mainly with their direct neighbors. From the perspective
of the communication model, we assume that time is discrete. During one time step
each node will pick and communicate with a random neighbor. Major updates in the
network occur just once in a while (for example, in the described scenario, new mea-
surement data is made available once every 15 minutes). We will make use of the
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concept of time rounds and ask the nodes to update their local data at the beginning
of the rounds. The bootstrap problem and round-based time models received a lot of
attention in literature [19, 6, 31] - in our application scenario the constraints being very
loose allow for an algorithm like the one presented in [35].
We make no assumptions with respect to nodes stop-failing or new nodes joining the
network. The mechanism described below can accommodate these cases and the com-
putation results will adapt themselves to such changes.
3.1 Solution Outline
Our solution for computing the robustness metric uses a primitive for computing sums
in a distributed network inspired by the gossip-alike mechanism presented in [28] (see
Figure 1). The algorithm presented in [28] computes a sum of values distributed on
the nodes of a network by using a property of order statistics applied to a series of
exponential random variables. The algorithm resembles gossiping algorithms [19] but
differs in a number of important points.
Essentially, it trades communication for convergence speed. By relying on the prop-
agation of an extreme value (the minimum value in this case), locally computable, it
achieves the fastest possible convergence in a distributed network - O(D logN) time
steps (D is the diameter of the network and N the number of nodes). This speed is sig-
nificant compared to the original gossiping algorithms that converged in O(D2 logN)
time steps [9]. For example, in Figure 1 a N = 1000 nodes network with diameter
14 converges after the first 15 computation steps. The paid price is the increased mes-
sages size O(δ−2), where δ is a parameter defining the precision of the final result.
Assuming s as the ground-truth result, the algorithm offers an estimate in the interval
[(1− δ)s, (1 + δ)s] with an error  = O(1/poly(N)).
We extend the extreme value propagation mechanisms to account for dynamics in the
network. Specifically, we add a time-to-live field to each value - an integer value that
decreases with time and marks the age of the current value. This mechanism takes care
of nodes leaving the network, stop-crashing or resetting. In the example in Figure 1,
after convergence, we removed half of the nodes in the network at time 50. The effect of
expiring time-to-live (set to a maximum of 50 in this example) can be seen around the
time step 100. Furthermore, we extend the time-to-live expiry mechanism to achieve
a O(D logN + log T ) time steps value removal. In other words, if a certain extreme
value propagated through the network, we mark it as “expired” and assure its associated
time-to-live value to expire (reach 0) within O(D logN + log T ) time steps. This is
shown in Figure 1 in the interval 200 − 300. At time 200 half of the nodes in the
network changed their values randomly triggering the expiration mechanism.
Our distributed approach solves most of the scaling issues and proves to be highly
robust against network dynamics (e.g., network nodes becoming unavailable due to
failures, reconfiguration, new nodes joining the system, etc.). As we show in the fol-
lowing, our approach is very fast for a typical network, outperforming by far the speed
of centralized approaches. As the protocols rely on anonymous data exchanges, privacy
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ALGORITHM 1: PropagateMinVal(v, τ )
1 /* v, τ - received value and time-to-live */
2 /* vlocal, τlocal - local value and time-to-live */
3 /* create temporary variables */
4 (vm, vM )← (min(v, vlocal),max(v, vlocal))
5 (τm, τM )← corresponding (τ, τlocal) to (vm, vM )
6 /* update logic */
7 if vm == vM then
8 if vm < 0 then /* equal negative values */
9 τm ← Cτm
10 else /* equal positive values */
11 min(τm, τM )← max(τm, τM )− 1
12 else
13 if vm < 0 then /* at least one negative value */
14 if vm == −vM then
15 (τm, τM )← (T, T )
16 else
17 (τm, τM )← (Cτm, CτM )
18 else /* two different positive values */
19 τM ← τm − 1
20 /* update local variables */
21 (v, vlocal)← (vm, vm)
22 (τ, τlocal)← corresponding (τm, τM )
issues [27] are alleviated, as the identities of the system participants are not needed in
the computations.
The downsides of our approach map onto the known properties of this class of epi-
demic algorithms. Although anonymity is preserved, an authentication system [20] is
needed to prevent malicious data corrupting the computations. Also, a light form of
synchronization [35] is needed for coordinating nodes to report major changes in their
local values - fortunately, the nature of the problem we address here allows it.
3.2 Self-stabilizing Sum Computation - ComputeSum()
The basic mechanism behind the sum computation algorithm presented below relies
on minimum value propagation via gossiping. Assume that each node holds a positive
value xi. At each time step, each node chooses a random neighbor and they exchange
their values, both keeping the smallest value. The smallest value propagates fast in the
network, in O(D logN) time steps, via this push-pull gossiping mechanism (see [32]
Section 3.2.2.4 page 32).
Assume that each node i in the network holds a positive value xi. In order to compute
the sum of all n values in the network
(∑N
i=1 xi
)
, the authors of [28] propose that each
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node holds a vector v of m values, initially drawn from a random exponential random
distribution with parameter λi = xi. After a gossiping step between two nodes i and
j, the vectors vi and vj become equal and hold the minimum value on each position
of the initial vectors. Thus, given an index k ∈ (1,m), the resulting vectors v′i, v′j
will have the property v′i[k] = v
′
j [k] = min (vi[k],vj [k]). The authors show that,
after all vectors converge to some value v, the sum of xi values in the network may be
approximated by:
∑N
i=1 xi =
m∑m
k=1 v[k]
(see [32] Section 5.2.5.4 page 75).
We extend the algorithm presented in [28] by adding to each node a new vector τ i
holding a time-to-live counter for each value. This new vector is initialized with a
default value T , larger than the convergence time of the original algorithm (choosing a
proper value is explained below). The values in τ i decrease with 1 every time slot, with
one exception. The node generating the minimum vi[k] on the position k ∈ (1,m)
sets τ i[k] to T (see Algorithm 2 line 9). In the absence of any other dynamics, all
properties proved in [32] remain unchanged as the output of our approach is identical
to the original algorithm.
The main reason for adding the time-to-live field is to account for nodes leaving the
network or nodes that fail-stop. We avoid this way complicated mechanisms in which
nodes need to keep track of neighbors. Additionally, this mechanism does not make
use of node identifiers. The intuition behind this mechanism is that a node generating
the network-wide minimum on position k ∈ (1,m) will always advertise it with the
accompanying time-to-live set to the maximum T . The rest of the nodes will adopt the
value v[k] and have a value τ [k] decreasing with the distance from the original node.
T is chosen to be larger than the maximum number of gossiping steps it takes the min-
imum to reach any node in the network. In a gossiping step between two nodes i and
j, if vi[k] = vj [k] then the largest of the τ i[k] and τ j [k] will propagate (Algorithm 1
line 11). This means that τ [k] on all nodes will be strictly positive for as long as the
node is online. If the node that generated the minimum value on the position k goes of-
fline, all the associated τ [k] values in the network will steadily decrease (Algorithm 2
line 11) until they will reach 0 and the minimum will be replaced by next smallest value
in the network (Algorithm 2 lines 12-14). It will take T time steps for the network to
“forget” the value on position k. The graphical effect of thisO(T ) mechanism is shown
in Figure 1 in the interval 50− 150.
The second self-stabilizing mechanism targets nodes changing their values at runtime.
Assume a node changes its value xi to x′i at some time t. This change will trigger
a regeneration of its original samples from the exponential random variable vi to v′i.
Let k be an index with k ∈ (1,m). Let u be the vector containing the minimum
values in the network if the node i would not exist. In order to understand the change
happening when transitioning from xi to x′i we need to look at the relationship between
the individual values vi[k], v′i[k] and u[k]. As shown in Table 1, if u[k] is the smallest
of all three values then no change will propagate in the network. If v′i[k] is the smallest
value, then this will propagate fast, in O(D logN) time steps, with the basic extreme
propagation mechanism. If v′i[k] is the smallest then this value will remain in the
network until its associated time-to-live field will expire. As usually T  D we add a
mechanism to speed up the removal of this value from the network.
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ALGORITHM 2: ComputeSum (v, τ )
1 /* v
0 - original random samples vector on this node */
2 /* v, τ - received value and time-to-live vectors */
3 /* update all elements in the data vector */
4 for j = 1 to length(v) do
5 PropagateMinVal(v[j], τ [j])
6 /* time-to-live update - do once every timeslot */
7 for j = 1 to length(v) do
8 if v[j] == v0[j] then /* reinforce a minimum */
9 τ [j]← T
10 else
11 τ [j]← τ [j]− 1 /* decrease time-to-live */
12 if τ [j] <= 0 then /* value expired */
13 v[j]← v0[j]
14 τ [j]← T
15 /* estimate the sum of elements */
16 s← 0
17 for j = 1 to length(v) do
18 s← s+ abs(v[j])
19 return length(v)/s
The removal mechanism is triggered by the node owning the value that needs to be
removed (in our case node i) and works as follows: node i will mark the value vi[k]
as “expired” by propagating a negative value −vi[k]. This change will not affect the
extreme value propagation mechanism (see Algorithm 1) nor the estimation of the sum
(notice the use of the absolute value function in Algorithm 2 line 18). If node i contacts
a node also holding the value vi[k] then first, it will propagate the negative sign for the
value, also maximizing its time-to-live field to a large value T . Intuitively, as long as the
vi[k] is present in the network, the −vi[k] will propagate, over-writing it. Considering
the large range of unique float or double numbers versus the number of values in a
network at a given time, we can safely assume the values in the network to be unique.
The time-to-live field of any negative value will halve with each gossiping step (for C =
2) if it does not meet the vi[k] value (Algorithm 1 lines 9, 17). Intuitively, if a negative
value is surrounded by values other than vi[k], it will propagate while canceling itself
at the same time with an exponential rate. This mechanism resembles somewhat a
predator-prey model [2], where prey is represented by the vi[k] variable and predators
by −vi[k]. We designed it such that the populations cancel each-others, targeting the
fixed point at the origin as the solution for the accompanying Lotka-Volterra equations.
Lemma 3.1 Value removal delay
By using the value removal algorithm, the new minimum propagates in the network in
O(D logN + log T ) time steps.
Proof In the worst case scenario, the whole network contains the minimum value vi[k]
10
Propagation Ordering Previous Intermediate Final
none
u[k] < vi[k] < v
′
i[k] u[k] u[k] u[k]
u[k] < v′i[k] < vi[k] u[k] u[k] u[k]
slow
vi[k] < u[k] < v
′
i[k] vi[k] vi[k] u[k]
vi[k] < v
′
i[k] < u[k] vi[k] vi[k] v
′
i[k]
fast
v′i[k] < u[k] < vi[k] u[k] v
′
i[k] v
′
i[k]
v′i[k] < vi[k] < u[k] vi[k] v
′
i[k] v
′
i[k]
Table 1: Value propagation.
on position k, with the time-to-live field setup at maximum T .The negative value, be-
ing the smallest one in the network, propagates in O(D logN) in the whole network.
Again, in the worst case scenario, we will have a network with each node having the
value −vi[k] on position k with the time-to-live set to the maximum T . From this
moment on, the time-to-live will halve at each gossip step on each node (for C = 2),
reaching 0, in the worst case scenario in O(log T ) time steps. This is the worst case
because nodes may be contacted by several neighbors during a time step leading to a
much faster cancellation. Overall, the removal mechanism will be active for at most
O(D logN + log T ) time steps. This bound is an upper bound. In reality the spread
and cancellation mechanisms will act in parallel, leading to tighter bounds.
This result gives us the basis for choosing the T constant. Ideally, it should be chosen
as small as possible, in line with the diameter of the network. The fact that the removal
mechanism is affected only by log T lets us use an overestimate of T , which can be a
few orders of magnitude larger than the diameter of the network, with little impact on
the convergence speed. For example, if the network diameter is between 10 − 30 and
the values refresh each 10000 time steps, we can safely set T anywhere between 1000−
10000 (see Section 4.3). This will not affect the convergence of the sum computation
mechanism but allow for a timely account for a node removal.
All the mechanisms presented in this section lead to the sum computation mechanism
ComputeSum() presented in Algorithm 2. It holds the properties of the original al-
gorithm described in [28] and it additionally showcases self-stabilization properties to
account for network dynamics in the form of node removal and nodes changing their
values in batches.
3.3 Robustness Metric Computation
The robustness metric (see Section 2) is made up of two terms that can be computed
locally (pi in Equation (2) and Rn,i in Equation (3)) and two that can be computed in a
distributed fashion (δi in Equation (4) and RCF in Equation (5)). Equation (5) can be
rewritten as:
RCF =
∑N
i=1Rn,iPi∑N
j=1 Pj
, (6)
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Figure 2: The actual demand profile from a point in Dutch transmission grid and two
synthetically generated demand profiles.
leading to a solution with two ComputeSum() algorithms in parallel. The first algo-
rithm will compute
∑N
i=1Rn,iPi, while the second one will compute
∑N
j=1 Pj .
Characterizing the convergence time of a composition of distributed algorithms is a dif-
ficult task in general. Fortunately, in our case, the composition of the twoComputeSum()
has the convergence time equal to each of the two mechanisms, leading to the same
O(D logN + log T ) time steps complexity. Assume the network is stabilized - once
the power distributions Pi change both the values
∑N
i=1Rn,iPi and
∑N
j=1 Pj will sta-
bilize in O(D logN + log T ) in parallel, as they do not require intermediate results
from each other.
As the type of gossiping algorithms we use are based on minimum value propagation,
all the nodes in the network will have the same value once the algorithm converged.
Stabilization can be easily detected locally by monitoring the lack of changes in the
propagated values for a fixed time threshold.
4 Analysis and Discussion
Our approach of computing the robustness metric is scalable and robust. In this sec-
tion we will focus on some of quantitative aspects, analyzing results obtained from
simulations based on synthetic and real data. The computer code implements the ap-
12
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 100  1000  10000  100000
Co
nv
er
ge
nc
e 
tim
e 
fro
m
 s
ta
rti
ng
 s
ta
te
 [ti
me
 st
ep
s]
Number of nodes
Network with diameter 1
Network with diameter 5
Network with diameter 10
Network with diameter 20
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proach described above and was implemented in Matlab and C++. In all simulations,
the nodes have been deployed in a square area. Their communication range was var-
ied to obtain the desired value for the diameter of the network. Networks made up of
several independent clusters were discarded.
4.1 Data Generation
As far as the authors are aware there is no data available in the public domain that
describes both the structure and the change in load over some time period for a power
grid. To show the effectiveness of our approach we have generated this data ourselves,
below we explain how this is done and we show the effectiveness of the proposed
distributed algorithm for calculating robustness of an operational grid.
The computation of the system robustness of a power grid requires data describing
its topology (i.e., interconnection of nodes with lines), the electrical properties of its
components (i.e., admittance values of the transmission lines), information about the
nodes (i.e., number and their types), and finally their generation and load values. The
IEEE power test systems [18] provide all of these data, the IEEE 118 power system
provides a realistic representation of a real world power transmission grid consisting
of 118 nodes and 141 transmission lines. We use this as a reference power grid.
The IEEE 118 power system gives information about the topology of the power grid.
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The loading profile provided with the grid topology [18] gives a representative load for
the network, but only for one moment in time. However, in practice, the topology of a
power grid remains generally unchanged over time (except for the maintenance, failure
and extension of the grid) while the generation/loading profile varies over time. This
changing nature of the loading profile (and accordingly the generation profile) results
in a varying robustness of the system over time. Therefore simulating the robustness
profile of a power grid for a whole day requires a demand profile belonging to the
whole day.
To obtain a varying robustness for the IEEE 118 power system, we randomly choose
10% of the power generation nodes of the power system which are then fed with syn-
thetic (generated) demand profiles. The demand values of other power generation
nodes remain unchanged. The demand profiles are generated based on an actual load
profile for a day of the Dutch grid on January 29, 2006. The demand at the correspond-
ing point in the Dutch grid is sampled per 15 minutes during the whole day. Figure 2
shows the demand profile. Based on this actual demand profile, additional synthetic
demand profiles are generated by (i) first introducing random noise to the actual de-
mand profile, and (ii) then by smoothing the curve out with a moving average [21]
with a window size of 10. Figure 2 illustrates the actual demand profile and two other
synthetically generated demand curves.
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4.2 Influence of Communication Topology
The underlying communication network for a smart grid can be implemented in a num-
ber of ways, mapping to different communication topologies. For example, one might
choose to use the internet backbone, allowing any-to-any communication in the net-
work, leading to a fully connected graph. In the first experiment, we have initialized
the network with a set of random variables and recorded the time when the aggregated
sum converges to the same value on all nodes. As seen in Figure 3, fully connected
networks lead to the fastest aggregate computation. In a second experiment, once the
network stabilized, we introduced a change in the form of half of the nodes in the net-
work changing their value to a different one. Again, we recorded the time until the
network stabilized after this change. As expected, Figure 4 shows that fully connected
networks stabilize the fastest after a disruption.
These results assume the internet backbone to work perfectly and able to route the
high level of traffic generated. A more realistic scenario is considering that the var-
ious data collection points obtain data from the individual consumers via some radio
technology (for example GPRS modems) and are themselves connected to the internet
backbone. To keep the traffic in the network to a minimum, the data collection points
only communicate with their network-wise first order neighbors, leading to a mesh net-
work deployment type. As seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4, the diameter of the network
clearly has the major impact factor on the results, confirming the theoretical conver-
gence results. The information needs at least O(D) time steps to propagate through
the network. The constant in the O() notation is influenced on one hand by the aver-
age connectivity in the network (a node can only contact a single neighbor per time
step, slowing information dissemination) and the push-pull communication model on
the other (a node may be contacted by several neighbors during a time step, speeding
up information dissemination).
4.3 Scalability Aspects
One of the main characteristics of our approach is that the algorithm we propose scales
very well with the number of nodes in the network. As seen again Figure 3 and Fig-
ure 4, the number of nodes has little influence in the final results (influencing only as
O(logN)). The simulation explored a space in which we varied the number of nodes
over four orders of magnitude and the results hint that tighter boundaries might exist
then the ones we proposed in this paper. We noticed that for a fully connected network,
the recovery time varies with 34% between a network with 1000 nodes and one with
100000 nodes, while the variation drops to a mere 2.4% for a 20-hop network varying
from 1000 nodes to 100000 nodes.
These results are very important for the smart grid application type. As the network
will be linked to a physical space (a country or in general, a region), fully covering it,
the diameter of the network is expected to, at most, decrease with the addition of new
nodes. Intuitively, when thinking of nodes as devices with a fixed transmission range,
adding more devices in the same region may lead to shorter paths between various
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Figure 5: Influence of T parameter (random geometric graph, 10-hop network, half of
the nodes change their values randomly after initial network convergence).
points. The aggregate computation approach we propose shows on one hand an almost
invariance to the increase in the number of nodes in the network and a linear variation
with the diameter. These properties are essential for any solution that needs to take into
account that the number of participants in the grid will most likely increase over time.
We are also interested in understanding the effects the time-to-live of the negative fields
has on the convergence and scalability properties. We have considered a 10-hop net-
work with 1000 to 5000 nodes and varied the time-to-live for negative values between
500 and 10000. Figure 5 confirms Lemma 3.1 with respect to the log T term. As the
data shows, the convergence time was affected very little by the chosen parameters. As
expected, the diameter of the network has the larger influence in this mechanism.
4.4 Robustness Metric Computation
Figure 6 shows the distributed computation method performing with real data sets,
obtained through the method described in Section 4.1. We plotted the results of two
simulation runs versus the ground truth data, obtained via centralized computation.
The length of the value vector was varied from 1000 values to 10000 values, the results
confirming that precision can be set to the desired value, independent of the network
topology and size. When using a vector of 1000 elements, we obtained a mean relative
error of 3% (maximum relative error 11% with a standard deviation of 2.6%). Using
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tributed algorithm, synthetic data - see Section 4.1, each point represents network data
after convergence; the line RCF = 0.67 illustrates a critical threshold below which
line failures can lead to large blackouts in this particular network).
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a larger vector (10000 elements) we were able to obtain a mean relative error of 1%
(maximum relative error of 4% with a standard deviation of 0.8%). These figures
are very good, taking into account that they result from a combination of distributed
computations with all the fault tolerant mechanisms enabled.
The figure also includes a line (with robustness value 0.67) that illustrates the critical
threshold, set by the grid operator. If the robustness metric drops below this value then
a power line failure can lead to a blackout that effects more then 20% of the power
grid. This threshold value was obtained by running cascading failure simulations on
the IEEE 118 power grid system using targeted attacks (i.e., we considered a worst
case scenario). We refer to [25] for a structured methodology for determining such
thresholds.
The critical threshold chosen above, that effects more 20% of the power grid, is more
or less arbitrary and mainly chosen for illustration purposes. In practice various other
factors have to be taken into account by grid operators (line capacities, maintenance
cycles) to determine realistic threshold values, but this should illustrate the feasibility
of the approach as it clearly shows that the error rate of the distributed algorithm is
much smaller then minimal required drop in robustness value that is needed to meet
the threshold.
Besides the quantitative values shown in Figure 6 we would like to point that our ap-
proach is different from traditional approaches that try to capture the global state of
the network and then take decisions centrally (see Section 5). Our approach pushes
the computation of the robustness metric in the network, its results being available at
each node as soon as the computations converge. This mechanism can be easily used
as a measurement phase, leading to the possibility of implementing distributed control
loops on top of it.
5 Monitoring and Cascading Failures in Power Grids
Three types of related work on monitoring the state of a power grid can be distin-
guished: (i) metrics that aim to quantify the vulnerability of the power grid against
cascading failures, (ii) simulation models that aim to predict the impact of node/line
outages and (iii) sensor networks that aim to capture the operative state of the power
grid.
There exists a significant body of work on defining metrics that assess the vulnerability
of the power grid against cascading failures. Most studies deploy a purely topological
or an extended topological approach mainly relying on graph theoretical measures such
as betweenness centrality [34]. However, these studies [22, 10, 7, 8] only focus on the
topological properties of power grids and fail to take the operative state of the network
into account. In effect this means that such metrics cannot be used to assess the change
in vulnerability of operational power grids. In addition to these topological approaches,
others [37, 4] propose measures relying on simulation models. Although, these metrics
incorporate also the operative state of a power network, it is very challenging to deploy
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them to quantify the system’s resilience against cascading failures in (near) real-time
because their computation requires full knowledge of the power grid state in order to
simulate cascades. Our earlier work [24, 23] (also see Section 2) forms a noticeable
exception to this, since it defines a metric that considers both the topological and the
operative state of a power grid, while not requiring any computationally expensive tasks
(e.g., computing the full network state in order to simulate cascades in the network).
Grid operators traditionally assess the network operation by relying on flow based sim-
ulation models (i.e., N-x contingency analysis [14]). These models take the opera-
tional behavior of the power grid into account. Grid operators can calibrate the model
to match the power grid of interest and run various scenarios to assess the impact of
one or two lines failing. There are two problems with such tools: they depend on
the knowledge of the grid operator who determines which failure scenarios to explore.
In addition, due to the complexity of the simulation models it is typically not possi-
ble to run scenarios where more than two components fail. The monitoring approach
proposed in this paper may complement current grid operator practices.
There are numerous papers that describe distributed architectures that can be used to
monitor the state of the power grid. However, these typically focus on the issue of
data collection [38, 36, 17, 11, 3, 29, 39, 16] (i.e., loading levels of power lines, phase
angles etc.) and do not use any meaningful data aggregation mechanisms to quantify
the resilience with respect to cascading failures of the whole power grid. In conclusion,
as far as the authors are aware, there are no power grid monitoring approaches that
assess the vulnerability, with respect to cascading failures, of an operational power
grid in near real-time.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a novel distributed computation framework for network
aggregates and showed how it can be used to assess the resilience with respect to cas-
cading failures of an operational power grid in near real-time. We have enhanced a
class of fast gossiping algorithms [9] with self-stabilizing mechanisms to counter run-
time network dynamics. To showcase the capabilities of our approach, we exemplified
how the robustness metric introduced in [23, 24] can be computed fast and reliable in
a distributed network - IEEE 118 power grid.
Our contribution has a number of desirable properties such as scalability and robust-
ness. Simulation results performed with both real and synthetic data show that our
approach achieves very fast convergence times, influenced mainly by the diameter of
the network and only logarithmically by the number of nodes in the network. This
property is very important in the context of smart grids, where the number of nodes
deployed over a given area (a region or a country) is expected to increase in the next
few decades.
The precision of the computations can be fixed by modifying the size of the messages
exchanged in the network. This is a crucial property for scalability, as the size of the
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messages is not a function of the number of nodes in the network. More importantly,
the computation error scales asO(1/poly(N)), meaning that the more nodes a network
has, the smaller the final error is. Finally, our scheme preserves the anonymity of the
participants in the network, as it does not rely on unique identifiers for the nodes of the
network.
The main message of this paper can be summarized in that we showed that it is possible
to compute complex aggregates of the operational state of the nodes in a network in
a fully distributed manner, fast and reliable at runtime. As automatic control systems
always include a measurement phase, we see our contribution as the perfect candidate
for the measurement block for an automated distributed control scheme. While this
paper focused on the measurements of network properties, future work will investigate
the actuation part triggered by the availability of results given by different power grid
metrics.
Acknowledgment
This work was partly funded by the NWO project RobuSmart: Increasing the Robustness of
Smart Grids through distributed energy generation: a complex network approach, grant num-
ber 647.000.001 and by the Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland grant TKISG01002 SG-
BEMS.
References
[1] R. Albert, I. Albert, and G. L. Nakarado. Structural vulnerability of the North American
power grid. Physical Review E, 69:25103, 2004.
[2] R. Arditi and L. R. Ginzburg. Coupling in predator-prey dynamics: Ratio-dependence.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 139(3):311 – 326, 1989.
[3] D. E. Bakken, C. H. Hauser, H. Gjermundrød, and A. Bose. Towards more flexible and
robust data delivery for monitoring and control of the electric power grid. School Elect.
Eng. Comput. Sci., Washington State University, Tech. Rep. EECS-GS-009, 2007.
[4] Z. J. Bao, Y. J. Cao, G. Z. Wang, and L. J. Ding. Analysis of cascading failure in electric
grid based on power flow entropy. Physics Letters A, 373:3032–3040, 2009.
[5] V. Belevitch. Summary of the history of circuit theory. Proceedings of the IRE, 50(5):848–
855, 1962.
[6] N. Bicocchi, M. Mamei, and F. Zambonelli. Handling dynamics in diffusive aggregation
schemes: An evaporative approach. Future Generation Computer Systems, 26(6):877–889,
2010.
[7] E. Bompard, R. Napoli, and F. Xue. Analysis of structural vulnerabilities in power trans-
mission grids. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2(1-2):5–12,
2009.
[8] Bompard, Ettore and Napoli, Roberto and Xue, Fei. Extended topological approach for the
assessment of structural vulnerability in transmission networks. IET Generation, Trans-
mission and Distribution, 4:716–724, 2010.
20
[9] S. Boyd, A. Ghosh, B. Prabhakar, and D. Shah. Gossip algorithms: Design, analysis and
applications. In INFOCOM 2005. 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies. Proceedings IEEE, volume 3, pages 1653–1664. IEEE, 2005.
[10] X. Chen, Q. Jiang, and Y. Cao. Impact of characteristic path length on cascading failure of
power grid. In Power System Technology, 2006. PowerCon 2006. International Conference
on, pages 1–5, 2006.
[11] L. Dan, H. Fukun, G. Ziming, et al. Wide-area real time dynamic security monitoring
system of north china power grid. Power System Technology, 28(23):52–56, 2004.
[12] I. Dobson, J. Chen, J. S. Thorp, B. A. Carreras, and D. E. Newman. Examining critical-
ity of blackouts in power system models with cascading events. In Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, 2002.
[13] A. El-Sakkary. The gap metric: Robustness of stabilization of feedback systems. Automatic
Control, IEEE Transactions on, 30(3):240–247, 1985.
[14] R. B. et al. Vulnerability assessment for cascading failures in electric power systems. In
Power Systems Conference and Exposition, PSCE, IEEE, 2009.
[15] L. C. Freeman. A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry, pages
35–41, 1977.
[16] A. P. Grilo, P. Gao, W. Xu, and M. C. de Almeida. Load monitoring using distributed
voltage sensors and current estimation algorithms. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on,
5(4):1920–1928, 2014.
[17] V. C. Gungor, B. Lu, and G. P. Hancke. Opportunities and challenges of wireless sensor
networks in smart grid. Industrial Electronics, IEEE Transactions on, 57(10):3557–3564,
2010.
[18] IEEE test systems data. Available at: http://www.ee.washington.edu/
research/pstca/.
[19] M. Jelasity, A. Montresor, and O. Babaoglu. Gossip-based aggregation in large dynamic
networks. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 23(3):219–252, 2005.
[20] G. Jesi, D. Hales, and M. van Steen. Identifying malicious peers before it’s too late: A
decentralized secure peer sampling service. In Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems,
2007. SASO ’07. First International Conference on, pages 237–246, July 2007.
[21] J. Kenney and E. Keeping. Mathematics of Statistics, Pt. 1, chapter 14.2 "Moving Aver-
ages", pages 221–223. Princeton, NJ, 1962.
[22] C. J. Kim and O. B. Obah. Vulnerability assessment of power grid using graph topological
indices. International Journal of Emerging Electric Power Systems, 8:1–15, 2007.
[23] Y. Koç, M. Warnier, F. M. T. Brazier, and R. E. Kooij. A robustness metric for cascad-
ing failures by targeted attacks in power networks. In In proceedings of the 10th IEEE
International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control (ICNSC’13), pages 48–53,
Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2013.
[24] Y. Koç, M. Warnier, R. E. Kooij, and F. M. T. Brazier. An entropy-based metric to quantify
the robustness of power grids against cascading failures. Safety Science, 59(8):126–134,
2013.
[25] Y. Koç, M. Warnier, P. Van Mieghem, R. E. Kooij, and F. M. T. Brazier. A topological
investigation of phase transitions of cascading failures in power grids. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications, 2014 (to appear).
21
[26] G. M. Masters. Renewable and efficient electric power systems. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
[27] P. McDaniel and S. McLaughlin. Security and Privacy Challenges in the Smart Grid. IEEE
Security and Privacy, 7(03):75–77, 2009.
[28] D. Mosk-Aoyama and D. Shah. Fast distributed algorithms for computing separable func-
tions. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 54(7):2997–3007, 2008.
[29] K. Moslehi and R. Kumar. A reliability perspective of the smart grid. Smart Grid, IEEE
Transactions on, 1(1):57–64, 2010.
[30] A. E. Motter and Y.-C. Lai. Cascade-based attacks on complex networks. Phys Rev E, page
065102, 2002.
[31] A. Pruteanu and S. Dulman. Lossestimate: Distributed failure estimation in wireless net-
works. Journal of Systems and Software, 85(12):2785–2795, 2012.
[32] D. Shah. Gossip algorithms. Now Publishers Inc, 2009.
[33] M. Vaiman, K. Bell, Y. Chen, B. Chowdhury, I. Dobson, P. Hines, M. Papic, S. Miller, and
P. Zhang. Risk assessment of cascading outages: Part i; overview of methodologies. In
Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2011 IEEE, pages 1 –10, july 2011.
[34] P. Van Mieghem. Performance analysis of communications networks and systems. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006.
[35] G. Werner-Allen, G. Tewari, A. Patel, M. Welsh, and R. Nagpal. Firefly-inspired sensor
network synchronicity with realistic radio effects. In Proceedings of the 3rd international
conference on Embedded networked sensor systems, pages 142–153. ACM, 2005.
[36] Y. Yang, D. Divan, R. G. Harley, and T. G. Habetler. Power line sensornet-a new concept
for power grid monitoring. In Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2006. IEEE,
pages 8–pp. IEEE, 2006.
[37] M. Youssef, C. Scoglio, and S. Pahwa. Robustness measure for power grids with respect
to cascading failures. In Proceedings of the Cnet 2011, pages 45–49. ITCP, 2011.
[38] S. Zanikolas and R. Sakellariou. A taxonomy of grid monitoring systems. Future Genera-
tion Computer Systems, 21(1):163–188, 2005.
[39] H.-T. Zhang and L.-L. Lai. Monitoring system for smart grid. In Machine Learning and
Cybernetics (ICMLC), 2012 International Conference on, volume 3, pages 1030–1037.
IEEE, 2012.
[40] N. Zhang, T. Zhou, C. Duan, X.-j. TANG, J.-j. HUANG, Z. LU, and C.-q. KANG. Impact of
large-scale wind farm connecting with power grid on peak load regulation demand. Power
System Technology, 34(1):152–158, 2010.
22
